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THE BILL OF RIGHTS REVIEW

him the right to make the statements
attributed to him. If the words were
actually spoken by him, they may reasonably be considered as manifesting a
spirit of intolerance. Perhaps here we
reach the end of the requirements of tolerance. For we are entitled at least to
be intolerant of intolerance. The New
Jersey legislature has not long ago enacted a so-called group-libel statute,
making criminal the utterance of remarks calculated to incite racial or religious hatred or prejudice. Thus is a
limitation upon freedom of expression
given sanction in the interests of the

general welfare. Its efficiency and desirability will be determined only in the
consequences to follow.
The tolerance exemplified by Jefferson is a wondrous treasure until it is
abused. It is inextricably intertwined
with good taste. As Jefferson said, "It
is the manner and spirit of a people
which preserve a republic in vigor. A
degeneracy in these is a canker which
soon eats to the heart of its laws and
constitution." We cannot afford to let
the canker grow.
JOHN

E.

MULDER

THE RIGHT TO HEAR
N every crisis the demand for restric-

tions on the freedom of speech seems
plausible because of the compelling
needs of national security and defense.
Implicit in the demand for restriction is
the possibility that free speech will be
the tool for its own destruction. That
it has this capacity cannot be doubted.
Nor can it be denied that foreign agents
have used the privilege to further their
own subversive influence.
Thus the demand for the curtailment
of speech must be seriously considered.
Why curtail speech? Because it will
be believed? Because it will incite
action? Because it will destroy or impair the operation of government? Any
or all of these consequences may result.
The question is simply this: Is the
probability of these occurrences sufficient to justify the limitation of unrestricted speech? Can we judge between
these two equally important interests
of the American people-between the

security of government and our individual freedoms?
Important as is the right of free
speech, if the exercise of it results in the
destruction or serious impairment of
government, it should be limited. Even
the greatest aggrandizement of individual right does not justify the destruction
of the state, except, of course, for anarchists. Thus a defense of the unlimited
right of free speech cannot be founded
on the right of the speaker. It must
have a firmer base. That firmer base is
the right to hear-to hear all facts and
theories, all truths, half-truths, and even
untruths concerning the political, social,
and economic society in which we live.
The individual right of speech is significant only because it is the best means
of insuring the collective right of all
men to hear. Deprive them of that
right and popular confidence in government turns to mass suspicion. Suppress
the means of political discussion and
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popular participation in government is
superseded by ignorant obedience or
uninformed hatred. The permanent
strength of government depends upon
a strong, well-informed, and confident
citizenry. Confidence does not breed in
the darkness of suppression.
There are no short cuts to the truth.
The wisest men of their times persecuted
Galileo, daVinci, Servetus, and many
others. Rousseau, Des Cartes, Pascal,
Moliere, Comte, Maupassant, Zola, to
mention but a few, were never admitted
to the French Academy. The Royal
Society failed to honor many of the
greatest men of England. Contemporary evaluation by men of admitted ability failed to recognize the genius that
time proved great.
Men tend to judge truth by the standards they have; new truths need new
standards. Only after two centuries of
persecution have we learned that in the
field of science advancement frequently
is made by denying the existing
"truths." In social science the unconventional is still heresy. Thus in political matters more than elsewhere we
must defend vigorously the right of men
to hear the new, the untried, the shocking. Time has proved that no man is
wise enough to decide what other men
shall hear. Holmes' judgment "that the
best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market" is well buttressed by historical experience. Those
in authority usually resist change and
deprecate opposing policies; change and
improvement in government can best be
realized by appeal to the electorate. It
may be objected, at this point, that if the
wisest men cannot determine the truth
then certainly the less qualified members
of society are not capable of distinguish-

ing truth from falsity. Although I
have full confidence in the ability of the
total citizenry (as distinguished from
all its individuals) to arrive at defensible judgments, even without that confidence I should still defend the right of
all to hear.
In a democracy men are entitled to
make their own decisions. If the judgment of the many is inadequate the
remedy must be found, as Brandeis said,
in "more speech, not enforced silence."
The security of popular government
depends upon a strong and liberal educational system-a system which embraces not only the formal system of
schools and colleges, but also the informal participation of individuals, civic
organization, clubs and assemblies.
If those who speak falsely are openly
challenged by the defenders of our
system, certainly the impact of numbers
and of integrity and responsibility
should favor the democratic process.
The difficulty is that few of us are willing to expend the time and effort that
defense requires. It is so much easier
to silence an opponent than to answer
him that we select through indolence the
lazy way. If our freedom means anything to us it is worth fighting for; it
is worth talking about. We should meet
challenge with reply-falsity with truth.
To prohibit the charge rather than to
refute it may imply its validity-to
answer is to destroy it.
The greatest threat to democracy lies
in our own unwillingness to preserve the
rights that only democracy guarantees.
I do not think that we are so indolent
that we will not meet the attack, reveal
the falsehoods, and disclose as Thomas
Jefferson said, that "we have nothing to
fear from the demoralizing reasonings
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of some, if others are left free to demonstrate their errors."
In his famous concurring opinion in
the Whitney case, Brandeis asserted that
"freedom to think as you will and to
speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech
and assemblage discussion would be futile; that the greatest menace to freedom
is an inert people." Here is a clear expression of the goal of free speech-the
participation of the people in the process
of government. This standard of collective responsibility in government is a
safer base for the defense of the individual speaker than his own more
immediate right to speak. The violence
of his ideas, the color of his language,
the abhorrence of the principle for
which he stands may frequently obscure
reason and distort judgment. In deciding when he can speak and how much he
can say let us remember that his pro-

tection is incidental. The real protection
is to those of us who participate democratically in the process of government.
Are we prepared to act with less than
all the information that is available?
Can we vote intelligently if we know
only one side? Who shall decide what
we shall hear? Whom do we wish to
place in judgment on our judgment?
Most of us do not speak-at least publicly-on the affairs of the nation; but
all of us participate in the selection of
representatives and exercise our judgment on the policies government pursues. This being the case let us recognize that the right we defend is not the
right of some isolated and often misguided speaker; we defend our own
right to hear-our right to have all the
information and all the interpretations
necessary for an intelligent preservation
of the democratic process.
FRANK

E.

HORACK, JR.

BRANDEIS - APOSTLE OF FREEDOM
N47,
Schenck
52, a

v. United States,
249 Court
U. S.
unanimous
Supreme
proclaimed the now-familiar test of
clear and present danger, defining the
extent to which Congress may constitutionally interfere with free speech: "The
question in every case is whether the
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is question of proximity and
degree."
Schenck was convicted for violation
of the Espionage Act of 1917.

The

nation was at war. Popular feeling
bordered on hysteria.
Holmes and
Brandeis joined the court in affirming
the conviction because in their judgment
the facts fell within the requirements of
the test of clear and present danger.
The test is a denial of the theory that
free speech is a right absolute in nature.
It is based upon expediency; it acts as a
guide in the determination of the conflict between the necessity of protecting
the existence of the nation and at the
same time preserving for the individual
the greatest freedom of expression possible in view of varying circumstances.
Difficulties arise in its application to

